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CaseNo.20090845-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Billy Justin Charles, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Amended Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for murder. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)G) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant's girlfriend was killed on August 7, 1996. Eleven years later, the State 
charged Defendant with her murder. 
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for not arguing that the preaccusation delay violated 
Defendant's due process rights, where no evidence showed that the delay was the result of 
bad faith, or that it prejudiced Defendant? 
Standard of Review: This claim was unpreserved, and Defendant does not argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. To avoid the consequences of not preserving his claim, 
Defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel, but this claim is inadequately briefed. If 
reached, review is for correctness. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
2. Was trial counsel ineffective for not producing additional evidence regarding 
Defendant's truck and alternate theory of the crime, where the proposed evidence was 
inconclusive and unlikely to lead to a different result? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for correctness. See id. 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by not giving Defendant's proposed 
jailhouse informant instruction verbatim, where the court did instruct the jury to view the 
jailhouse informant's testimony "with caution and close scrutiny"? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for correctness. State v. Killpack, 2008 
UT 49, If 18, 191 P.3d 17. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant's girlfriend, Jamie Weiss, was killed on August 7,1996. R. 342:170,192. 
On November 29,2007, Defendant was charged with one count of first degree murder. R. 1-
4. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. R. 259. 
Defendant subsequently moved to arrest judgment, claiming, in part, that the State had 
misrepresented the nature of its agreement with a jailhouse informant who had testified at 
trial. R. 322-31. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. R. 367-72. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 393-95. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant left for work at 6 a.m. on August 7, 1996, leaving behind his girlfriend 
Jamie Weiss and their two-year-old son. R. 347:21-22; 348; 67-68. Four hours later, Jamie 
was found dead, submerged in a bathtub. R. 342: 168-69. After an autopsy later that day, 
the medical examiner concluded that Jamie was already dead when Defendant left for work. 
R. 346:62-63. 
Defendant's neighbor sees him leaving for work alone 
on the morning of the murder 
Defendant had a tumultuous relationship with Jamie. They had a young son together, 
but they often argued, and they often broke up. R.342:162,178;346:125;348:218. Jamie 
moved out of their trailer home for a time in early 1996, but moved back in July 1996. R. 
348:218. 
Stephen Heidt lived next door to Defendant and Jamie. R. 347:19. Around 6:00 a.m. 
on August 7,1996, Heidt began loading his car for a family trip. R. 347: 21. The sun was 
already up, and Heidt had a clear view of Defendant's driveway. R. 347: 22, 36, 39-40. 
Heidt noticed Defendant's truck idling in the driveway, but did not see anybody else around 
the truck. R. 347: 23, 36. R. 347: 23. Heidt thought this unusual, given that there was no 
need to warm a truck on an August morning. R. 347: 39, 49. 
"In setting out the facts from the record on appeal... all conflicts and doubts" are 
resolved "'in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court.'" State v. Yanez, 
2002 UT App 50, \ 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (citation omitted). 
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Heidt made a series of trips in and out of his home between 6:00 and 6:15 a.m. R. 
347: 41. During one trip, Heidt saw Defendant in the cab of his truck, backing out of the 
driveway. R. 347: 23-24, 42. Although Heidt "definitely" saw Defendant, he never saw 
Jamie—"either inside the car or underneath the car." R. 347: 24,42. He later testified that 
he had "a clear memory of not seeing" Jamie at any point that morning. R. 347: 49. 
Jamie is discovered dead in her 
bathtub four hours later 
Around 10:30 that morning, Lisa Charles, Defendant's 16-year-old sister, arrived to 
pick Jamie up for a nail appointment. R. 342: 162. When she arrived, she found Jesse, 
Jamie's 2-year-old son, alone in the yard and wearing nothing but a T-shirt. R. 342: 162. 
Defendant's dog was also in the yard. R. 342: 162. The dog was a "full sized pit bull," 
known to be "very protective" and "aggressive" to strangers. R. 342: 190; 348: 58, 70.2 
Lisa thought the situation odd, because Jamie was a good mother who "wouldn't 
leave [her son] alone." R. 342: 163. When Lisa asked Jesse where his mother was, he 
responded that she was "sleeping." R. 342: 164. Lisa then entered the home, where she 
found Jamie naked, submerged in the bathtub, with the water in the tub running "full blast." 
R. 342: 168-70. The tub was overflowing, and the bathroom floor was covered in water. R. 
342: 170. Jamie was obviously dead. R. 342: 168-70, 192. 
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 In fact, when officers arrived later that day, the dog "tried to come over the fence" 
and had to be restrained. R. 342: 190. 
4 
Defendant shows no grief after learning of Jamie's death, 
but instead begins a fight with police officers 
Defendant had recently begun a new job, so officers were unable to locate him and 
inform him of Jamie's death until he arrived home later that afternoon. R. 342: 196. By 
then, the home was taped off as a crime scene, and a number of Defendant's family members 
were gathered outside on the street. R. 342: 196. Officer Henry Beltran stood a few feet 
away when Defendant's father informed Defendant that Jamie had been killed. R. 342:197. 
Officer Beltran was "rather surprised" at Defendant's reaction. R. 342:197. Defendant did 
not begin crying—in fact, he "didn't really show any emotion" at all. R. 342: 197. Nor did 
Defendant ask any questions about how Jamie died. R. 342:197. Instead, he simply tried to 
get through the police tape to get to the home. R. 342: 198. When an officer stopped him, 
Defendant said: "I need to see if any of my stuff has been stolen." R. 342:199. Those were 
the first words Officer Beltran heard him say after learning of Jamie's death. R. 342: 199. 
Defendant tried going through the police tape again, but an officer again stopped him. 
R. 342: 199. Defendant then shoved the officer to the ground. R. 342: 199, 216. When 
Officer Beltran tried to restrain Defendant, Defendant's father punched Officer Beltran in the 
face. R. 342:200-05. Several of Defendant's family and friends then "jumped" the officers, 
resulting in a "full-blown fight." R. 342: 202. After officers sent out an emergency distress 
signal, additional officers arrived and the scene was secured. R. 342: 203. 
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The police interview 
After calming down, Defendant agreed to a police interview. Detective Kris Ownby 
conducted the interview later that evening. R. 348: 63. Defendant was asked about his 
whereabouts that day. He said that he had woken up at 5:40 a.m., started his truck to let it 
"warm up," and then left for work around 6 a.m. R. 348: 66. 
Defendant initially said that Jamie was asleep when he left for work. R. 348: 98. 
Defendant explained that Jamie and their son usually slept until 10 or 10:30 a.m, and that 
Jamie had maybe woken up "to kiss him goodbye." R. 348:75-76,98. On further reflection, 
however, he changed his story and said that Jamie had actually woken up to help him start 
his truck that morning. R. 348: 66. 
Defendant explained that there was a problem with his truck's linkage. R. 348: 68. 
According to Defendant, he could not shift from neutral into gear (i.e. either into reverse or 
drive) from inside the cab. R. 348: 109. Rather, he said that he could only do this from 
underneath the truck. R. 348: 109. To avoid being run over, he said that a second person 
needed to sit in the cab and hold the brake down while he shifted it into gear from under the 
truck. R. 348:67-68,108-09. Defendant said that Jamie had helped him do this when he left 
for work that morning, and that she was alive when he last saw her. R. 348: 67-68. 
During later interviews, however, Defendant admitted that he could sometimes shift 
the truck into bear on his own without help. For example, Defendant claimed that he did not 
3
 Defendant's truck was an automatic. R. 348: 171. 
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need help starting the truck at work, because (1) the truck had had the opportunity to warm 
up, and (2) his jobsite was on a flat surface—thereby allowing him to get under the truck 
without fear of being run over. R. 348: 71,109. Defendant also claimed that he had driven 
over to his sister's home on the morning of the murder, and that he had been able to shift the 
truck into gear on his own at her house that morning by using a mason's brush as the braking 
mechanism. R. 348: 113. 
When Defendant arrived home on the afternoon of the murder, he arrived on foot. R. 
342: 196. When asked about this, Defendant said that he had run out of gas several miles 
away, and that after leaving his truck by the side of the road, a friend had driven him home. 
R. 348: 72: 120. 
Detective Ownby noticed "scrapes and scratches" on Defendant's face and neck 
during the interview. R. 348:71. When he asked Defendant about them, Defendant claimed 
that they resulted from the altercation with law enforcement earlier that day. R. 348: 72. 
Like Officer Beltran earlier that day, Detective Ownby thought that Defendant's 
reaction to Jamie's death unusual. Detective Ownby had worked as a homicide detective for 
five years. R. 348: 165. Defendant "react[ed] differently" than others he had observed in 
similar situations. R. 348: 165. Not only was Defendant not crying, but he did not even 
seem to be upset by Jamie's death. R. 348: 165. 
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The investigation refutes Defendant's 
claims regarding his truck 
Officers located Defendant's truck on the side of the road and had it towed to a state-
run mechanic's shop, where it was examined by Officer Wayne Smith, an expert mechanic 
employed by the Utah Highway Patrol. R. 348: 120, 166-68. 
Officer Smith first noticed that, contrary to Defendant's claim, the truck was not out 
of gas. R. 348: 172. More importantly, Officer Smith found no support for Defendant's 
claim that problems with the truck's linkage prevented the driver from shifting into gear 
from inside the truck. R. 348:172. To the contrary, Officer Smith was able to shift into gear 
from inside the cab without assistance. R. 348: 172-73. 
Officer Smith also concluded that even if there had been a linkage problem, 
Defendant could have shifted into gear without assistance for a variety of reasons. First, the 
truck's neutral safety switch had been disabled. R. 348: 173. The neutral safety switch 
ordinarily prevents a vehicle from being started in gear; but because this one had been 
disabled, Defendant would have been able to simply start his truck in drive without having to 
get under the truck. R. 348: 173. Second, Officer Smith discovered that the truck's gears 
could be shifted from under the hood—thereby obviating any need to get under the truck if 
the driver had been unable to shift into gear from inside. R. 348: 175. Finally, even if 
Defendant had needed to get under the truck, the parking brake was in working order. 
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R. 348: 175. Thus, Officer Smith could see "no reason" why anybody would need to get 
under the truck to shift into gear. R. 348: 175.4 
The medical examiner concludes that 
Jamie was dead before Defendant left for work 
Dr. Todd Grey, the State's Chief Medical Examiner, examined Jamie's body at the 
trailer at approximately 12:20 p.m. R. 346:21,24, 56.5 Jamie's body was then transported 
to the state lab, where Dr. Grey conducted an autopsy. Dr. Grey found a series of large 
bruises and hemorrhages around Jamie's head. R. 346:25,29,35. Internal evidence showed 
that she had been strangled, including bruising and hemorrhaging in her neck muscles, 
pinpoint hemorrhaging in her eyes, and bruising on her inner lips suggested that something 
had been pushed into her mouth against her teeth. R. 346: 32, 33. Dr. Grey accordingly 
determined that Jamie had been killed by a combination of blunt force trauma to her head 
and asphyxiation. R. 346: 65. Significantly, Dr. Grey found "no evidence of aspiration of 
water": there was no water in her lungs or any "water or foam in her airway." R. 346: 47. 
Thus, Dr. Grey concluded that Jamie was dead before she was placed in the tub. R. 346:47. 
4
 Officer Smith also rejected Defendant's claim that he would need to warm up the 
truck on an August morning. R. 348: 176. According to Officer Smith, there was no 
mechanical reason to have done this. R. 348: 176. 
5
 Dr. Grey has been the State's Chief Medical Examiner since 1988, and he has 
conducted over 11,000 post-mortem exams during that time. R. 346: 21-22. 
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Dr. Grey next assessed the time of death. R. 346:49. Dr. Grey later testified that four 
different tests are used to determine time of death: the change in body temperature, the 
change in potassium levels, the body's rigor mortis, and the body's lividity. R. 346: 49. 
All four tests showed that Jamie was dead before 6 a.m., the time at which Defendant 
had left for work. The change in Jamie's body temperature suggested that Jamie had been 
killed around 4:00 a.m., with an outer range of 11 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. R. 346: 57. The change 
in Jamie's potassium levels suggested that the time of death was between 10 p.m. and 3:20 
a.m. R. 346: 58. Dr. Grey's assessment of Jamie's rigor mortis suggested that she had been 
dead for eight to twelve hours when he examined her at 12:20 p.m., thereby suggesting a 
time of death between 12:20 and 4:20 a.m. R. 346: 58. Finally, Jamie's lividity at 12:20 
p.m.—i.e. the amount of "blanching" of the blood when someone touched Jamie's skin— 
suggested that she had been dead for 8-12 hours. R. 346: 54, 59. 
Based on these tests, Dr. Grey concluded to a degree of "medical certainty" that Jamie 
had been dead "before" 6:00 a.m, and his best estimate of the precise time was that she was 
killed between two and four a.m. R. 346: 61-62. As he later explained at trial, "based on 
everything that I could assess, I think that to have her be dead after 6 a.m. on the 7th, I don't 
know how all the postmortem changes that I've assessed could develop to the degree to 
which they had in that short period of time." R. 346: 63. 
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Subsequent investigation 
By the end of August 1996, officers had circumstantial evidence suggesting that 
Defendant had killed Jamie. The evidence showed that Jamie was dead when Defendant left 
for work on August 7, and officers believed that Defendant had lied to them about the 
condition of his truck. But officers did not have direct evidence that Defendant had killed 
her. As a result, they continued to investigate. 
Officers subsequently tested hairs found in Jamie's hand at the time of her death. 
They concluded that one of them was tiers, and the other two were dissimilar to Defendant's. 
R. 348: 131; 349: 9-10. Officers also interviewed nearby residents about reports of 
suspicious activity in the area around the time of Jamie's death. R. 348: 193; 349: 93, 98. 
Officers also investigated a letter they received in August 1996 taking responsibility 
for the murder. R. 348: 135; PSI: 4.6 This letter was signed by a "Jay Guerrero." PSI: 4. 
Officers searched for a person with that name who could have committed the crime; as part 
of that investigation, officers searched through INS records to determine whether any person 
with that name was living in Utah and could have committed the crime. PSI: 4. Officers 
6
 Some of the information regarding the police investigation was set forth in the PSI. 
"If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(6)(b) (West 2004). Utah courts have accordingly accepted the factual assertions made in a 
PSI as true when the defendant failed to specifically contest those assertions at sentencing. 
See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). Defendant did not challenge the 
PSFs account of the investigation at sentencing, so the State will rely on them for purposes 
of this appeal. 
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also tested the stamp on the letter for DNA and conducted a handwriting analysis, with both 
tests suggesting that there was a "strong probability that [Defendant] did not write" or send 
the letter. R. 348: 135, 137. 
The case was eventually moved to the cold case file, but officers still worked on it 
over the years. R. 348: 162. In 1997, officers conducted surveillance on Jamie's grave to 
"observe visitors," and put a hidden recording device nearby hoping to record a graveside 
confession. PSI: 4; R. 348: 163. Officers also conducted additional testing on the physical 
evidence. In 2007, officers sent out fingernail samples for further testing. R. 348: 163. 
Officers also put up billboards in which they requested information regarding Jamie's 
murder. R. 348: 163. In April 1998, a press release was issued offering $2500 "for 
information leading to the arrest and convictions of the individual responsible" for Jamie's 
death. PSI: 5. That request generated a number of "leads," but none panned out. PSI: 5. 
The reward was increased to $10,000 in January 2000. PSI: 5. At that point, a "witness was 
identified," but the witness was "uncooperative." PSI: 5. 
Officers also used the media to attract attention and try to develop leads. In 
November 1999, officers cooperated with KTVX for a special on the case. PSI: 5. The 
special generated "seven leads," all of which were "investigated." PSI: 5. In March 2002, 
officers similarly cooperated with a cable television special that profiled Jamie's murder as 
part of a series on cold cases. PSI: 5. 
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After filing charges, officers learn that Defendant had made 
incriminating statements to two witnesses 
In November 2007, the State decided to charge Defendant with Jamie's murder on the 
basis of the information already collected. R. 1-4. In the months before trial, the State 
learned that Defendant had made incriminating statements to two different people during the 
intervening years. 
The first was Shareen Martinez. Shareen had met Defendant a few years after Jamie's 
death. R. 347: 51-54. She soon had a child with Defendant, but the two broke up a short 
time later. R. 347: 58. 
When officers first spoke with Shareen in October 2002, she told them of a 
conversation she had with Defendant about Jamie's death. R. 348: 29. Defendant told her 
that before Jamie's death, someone tried to rob his trailer. R. 348: 29. He told Shareen that 
Jamie could identify the robbers, and suggested that the robbers had killed her for that 
reason. R. 348: 29. As police questioned her about this, Shareen admitted that she still 
thought that Defendant "could have" been the one who actually killed Jamie. R. 348: 44. 
In March 2008, Shareen spoke with officers again. This time, she told them about an 
argument she had with Defendant before his arrest. During that argument, Shareen called 
Defendant a "murderer." R. 348:44. This angered Defendant so much that he assaulted her. 
R. 348:44. He "dragged [her] down by [her] hair," breaking one of her ribs. R. 348:40,44. 
When Defendant subsequently apologized, he told her that he had hurt her "accidentally." R. 
13 
348: 40. In the course of that apology, he brought up Jamie, and said that he had 
"accidentally hurt" her, too. R. 348: 39. 
Defendant later claimed that when he spoke of "accidentally" hurting Jamie, he was 
referring to an argument he had with her several weeks before her death. R. 348: 41. After 
his arrest, however, Defendant repeatedly threatened Shareen, warning her not to speak to 
police. He made four to five phone calls in which he told Shareen that if she spoke with 
police, he would start a custody fight with her over their son. R. 348: 32. Defendant 
repeated this threat in a series of letters he wrote from jail. In those letters, he reminded her 
that his "parents have more money" than she does, and told her "not to say anything" to 
police. R. 348: 36. He said that if she did, she would not be allowed to see her son any 
more. R. 348: 36. 
In addition to Shareen, officers also learned about statements Defendant made to Troy 
Miller, a step-cousin of Defendant's whom he had known growing up. R. 347: 93-94. 
During the winter of 2008-09, the two happened to be jailed together while awaiting trials in 
their own cases. R. 347: 95. In January 2009, Defendant began talking with Miller about 
Jamie's death. Defendant told him that the medical examiner had not found water in Jamie's 
lungs, and "[tjhat's what is going to get me." R. 347: 100. Defendant also explained that 
before Jamie's death, he had been running a scheme where he would sell marijuana to 
people, and then an accomplice of his would go and steal the marijuana back. R. 347: 102. 
Defendant then said he and his accomplice had killed Jamie. He said that it "just wasn't 
14 
supposed to happen like that," and that "she was gone when we put her . . . in the tub." R. 
347:102. When Miller asked how Jamie had died, Defendant said that "she was strangled." 
R.347:102. 
Defendant's theory at trial 
At trial, Defendant's theory was that Jamie had been killed by robbers after he left for 
work. R. 342: 145-46; 348: 104, 230; 349: 93-98, 126, 171-72. In response to this theory, 
the State pointed out that a large number of expensive items were left untouched by Jamie's 
killer, including a Rolex watch on a bedroom dresser, a roll of cash on a shelf in the main 
room, Jamie's purse on the kitchen table, and stereo equipment in the main room. R. 348: 
57,59-61,101. The State also pointed out that Jamie was not alone that morning; rather, she 
was with the family's "full sized pit bull," known to be "very protective" and "aggressive" to 
strangers. R. 342: 190; 348: 58, 70. Despite this, there was no evidence of a struggle. 
Instead, even after Jamie's death, her two-year-old child thought that his mother was 
"sleeping." R. 342: 164. 
Defendant's principal claim was that Jamie was still alive when he left for work 
around 6 a.m. Defendant supported this with testimony from his brother, who said that on 
one occasion the previous week, he had put his foot on the brake of Defendant's truck while 
Defendant manually shifted into gear from underneath. R. 348: 206-08. But this claim was 
contradicted by the testimony of the State's mechanical expert who had examined the truck. 
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Defendant also called Dr. Robert Rothfeder, a former emergency room doctor, to 
testify about his conclusions regarding the time of Jamie's death. According to Dr. 
Rothfeder, Jamie could have been killed as late as 8 or 9 a.m., thereby supporting 
Defendant's claim that Jamie was alive when he left for work. R. 349: 39, 42. On cross-
examination, however, Dr. Rothfeder admitted that, unlike Dr. Grey, he is not a pathologist, 
and that he has never done any independent research on post-mortem science. R. 349: 55. 
Dr. Rothfeder also admitted that he has done only three to five post-mortem assessments, all 
while he was in medical school 30 years earlier. R. 349: 56, 58. Finally, unlike Dr. Grey, 
Dr. Rothfeder admitted that he never actually saw Jamie's body. R. 349: 63. 
Proceedings regarding Troy Miller's testimony 
Before trial, Defendant learned that in addition to this case, Troy Miller had also 
provided information to prosecutors regarding three other ongoing murder prosecutions. 
Partly due to reliability concerns, the trial court suspended rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
to allow Defendant to cross-examine Miller about his entire criminal history. R. 342: 15-17; 
346: 15-20; 348: 13-14. The jury accordingly heard about Miller's criminal background, 
including convictions that fell outside rule 609's ten-year limit R. 347: 114-20. The jury 
also heard extensive discussion of Miller's ongoing charges, and that he had recently 
provided information in four different ongoing murder investigations. R. 347:108,120-23. 
Defense counsel submitted a proposed jury instruction on the veracity of jailhouse 
informants. R. 231-32; 349: 130. The court declined to give Defendant's proposed 
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instruction verbatim, but did give an instruction telling the jury that the testimony of an in-
custody informant should be viewed with "caution and close scrutiny." R. 280; 349: 130. 
After verdict, Defendant moved to arrest judgment, claiming that the State had 
"misrepresented the nature of the benefit Mr. Miller would receive due to his cooperation" in 
Defendant's prosecution. R. 322-31. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the claim 
before sentencing. R. 343. The principal witness at that hearing was Chou Chou Collins, the 
prosecutor who had handled Miller's charges. R. 405: 7. 
Collins explained that Miller had pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, a third 
degree felony. R. 405: 7. When she arrived for his March 2, 2009, sentencing hearing, 
however, his criminal defense attorney informed her that Miller was cooperating in four 
pending homicide cases. R. 405: 8. At that point, Miller's attorney requested a continuance 
of sentencing to see whether Miller would fully cooperate in those cases. R. 405: 9, 11. 
Collins agreed, but told Miller's attorney that she was not inclined to give Miller a deal as a 
result of his cooperation in the other cases. R. 405: 10, 32. 
Collins initially believed that Miller should be sent to prison for 0-to-5 years, or at 
least serve "substantial jail time." R. 405: 22. But by the time of sentencing, Collins had 
reassessed the case and recommended that Miller serve only 32 additional days in jail. R. 
405: 11. She explained that she had changed her mind for three reasons. First, the victim in 
Miller's burglary had lost her job before Miller's sentencing and needed restitution. R. 405: 
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11-12. Miller had a job waiting for him upon release, so Collins decided that a shorter jail 
sentence would best serve the victim's interests. R. 405: 12. 
Second, Collins realized that Miller had already served over 360 days in jail on this 
case. R. 405:12. Collins had prosecuted property crimes since 2000, and in her experience, 
a person with a prior criminal history who committed a property crime like Miller's would 
normally serve only three to four months in prison. R. 405: 24-25. Thus, she believed that 
Miller had already been incarcerated for longer than usual, and she believed that if he were 
actually sent to prison, the parole board would likely release him immediately. R. 405: 12. 
Finally, Collins learned that Miller was scheduled to testify in a different murder trial 
after he testified in Defendant's case. Although Collins was inclined to request Miller's 
immediate release, she requested 32 more days so that the State would have guaranteed 
access to him during the second case. R. 405: 33-34. Thus, rather than receiving leniency at 
sentencing, Miller's cooperation actually earned him additional days in jail. R. 405: 33-34. 
Collins rejected any suggestion that her thinking was influenced by Vincent Meister, 
the prosecutor who handled Defendant's case. R. 405:25. Collins testified that the first, and 
only, time she spoke with Meister about Miller was on April 17, 2009, two weeks after 
Defendant's conviction. R. 405: 25. When Collins mentioned Miller, Meister told her that 
he did not want to "have anything to do with it" and walked out of her office. R. 405: 26. 
The court denied the motion to arrest judgment. R. 369-72. In its written ruling, the 
court found that Collins had "made it clear" that "she was neither promising nor offering 
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Miller a deal for his cooperation" in the prosecution of Defendant. R. 370. The court also 
concluded that Meister had not intervened in Miller's prosecution or sentencing. R. 370. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims that the State violated his due process rights by not filing 
charges until 11 years after Jamie's murder. Defendant did not raise this claim below. And 
though he now claims in a footnote that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising that 
argument, he has not adequately briefed an ineffective assistance claim on appeal. This 
claim should be rejected for that reason alone. 
If this Court nevertheless reaches Defendant's ineffective assistance claim, the claim 
should be rejected. First, Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel 
performed effectively, where the decision to not raise a due process objection allowed trial 
counsel to argue that the delay was improper to the jury without any contradiction from the 
record. Second, Defendant also has not proven that he was prejudiced by the preaccusation 
delay. Nothing in this record shows that the prosecutorial delay was the result of bad faith, 
nor is there any record support for the claim that any of the missing evidence would have 
mattered if it had been available at trial. 
Point II.A: Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing 
additional evidence regarding the alleged defects in his truck. But the evidence identified by 
Defendant does not directly support his claim; instead, Defendant points only to indirect 
evidence from witnesses who never actually drove the truck. By contrast, the State presented 
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direct testimony from a mechanic who did examine the truck, and that mechanic directly 
refuted Defendant's claims. Defendant has therefore not shown that there is a reasonable 
probability that the proposed testimony would have likely resulted in a different outcome. 
Point II.B: Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not securing the 
testimony of Brian Meik. But Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged error. According to Defendant's own proffer, Meik's testimony would have been 
decidedly ambiguous. Moreover, the State also proffered that if Meik had been called, he 
would have offered testimony that inculpated Defendant as well. As a result, there is no 
reasonable probability that Meik's testimony would have resulted in a different outcome at 
trial 
Point III: Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not 
giving his proposed instruction regarding jailhouse informants. But the trial court did 
instruct the jury that it should view a jailhouse informant's testimony with "caution and close 
scrutiny." This was more than Defendant was entitled to, and there was accordingly no 
reversible error in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE 11-YEAR PREACCUSATION 
DELAY VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IS UNPRESERVED, 
AND HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM IS BOTH 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND WITHOUT MERIT 
Defendant claims that the State violated his due process rights by "delaying its filing 
of charges for 11 years while not investigating other leads." Aplt. Br. 18. This Court should 
decline to address Defendant's due process claim because it is not preserved, and 
Defendant's off-hand claim in a footnote that his counsel was ineffective is inadequately 
briefed. If this Court excuses Defendant's failures, Defendant has not met his heavy burden 
of showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
A. Defendant's due process claim is unpreserved, and he has not 
adequately briefed any exception to the preservation rules. 
1. The claim is unpreserved. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal" unless the party shows plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1} 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
Defendant never argued below that his due process rights were violated by the 11 -year 
delay between Jaime's murder and the filing of charges. Indeed, Defendant acknowledges 
this in his brief, but nevertheless argues that the claim was still preserved when his trial 
counsel "repeatedly argued that the State's delay significantly prejudiced [his] defense." 
Aplt. Br. 18n.2. 
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Defendant is incorrect. As this Court noted in State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, ^  4, 
147 P.3d 969, the preservation rules require "specific objections in order to bring all claimed 
errors to the trial court's attention," so that the trial court has "an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate." (Quotations and citation omitted). For example, although Briggs 
"brought the alleged" error to the trial court's attention, the claim was still unpreserved for 
appeal because he had not articulated "a legal basis for his objection or requested] any 
specific relief." Id. This Court explained that an "'oblique reference to an issue in the 
absence of an objection to the trial court's failure to rule on the issue, does not put that issue 
properly before the court.'" Id. (citation omitted). To preserve a claim for appeal, the 
defendant must "'specify the alleged error and provide a legal justification to support his 
argument,'" thereby allowing the trial court to assess the claim '"in the context of the 
specific legal doctrine placed at issue.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
In this case, Defendant did refer to the preaccusation delay during trial, but he never 
objected based on the "specific legal doctrine" of a due process violation. Id. Although he 
now trivializes this distinction, suggesting that this was simply a "fail[ure] to mention the 
words 'due process,'" Aplt. Br. 18 n.2, the impact of his admitted failure is significant. As 
explained more fully below, the due process analysis for a preaccusation delay claim requires 
Defendant to prove that the State acted in bad faith, as well as that he suffered "actual 
prejudice" from the delay. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,^| 45,152 P.3d 321. By not objecting 
on due process grounds, Defendant created an evidentiary silence about these very issues. 
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Thus, Defendant's due process claim is based on nothing more concrete than his 
speculation about what the prosecution's reasons for delay might have been. But the burden 
was on Defendant to prove that the prosecution acted in bad faith, as well as that he was 
actually prejudiced by the delay. By not objecting, Defendant has foregone any opportunity 
to prove his claim. He has also deprived the State of the opportunity to rebut his claim by 
explaining its reasons, as well as assured that the trial court could never correct the alleged 
error. Under these circumstances, Defendant's claim is unpreserved. 
2. Defendant has not adequately briefed any exception to the 
preservation rules. 
Defendant briefs his claim as if it were preserved. In a footnote, however, he 
acknowledges that it might not be preserved. He does not argue that the plain error or 
exceptional circumstances doctrines apply. Those exceptions therefore are not before this 
Court. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 51,114 P.3d 551 (declining to review a plain error 
or exceptional circumstances claims when not raised in the opening brief); accord State v. 
Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 19, 122 P.3d 566. 
Instead, in three sentences only, he argues that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not raising a due process preaccusation delay claim. Aplt. Br. 18 n.2. This 
ineffective assistance claim is inadequately briefed. 
The rules of appellate procedure require a party to set forth the "contentions and 
reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
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the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "An argument that does not contain 
'reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority' is inadequately briefed and we will 
not consider the issue." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 15 n.l, 72 P.3d 138. 
Here, Defendant's discussion of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness comprises all of 
three sentences in a single footnote. See Aplt. Br. 18 n.2. Notably, that footnote does not 
cite, let alone discuss, any authority setting forth the standards for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, let alone explain how those standards apply to a due process claim that is 
based on a preaccusation delay. Thus, Defendant leaves it to the State, and ultimately this 
Court, to determine how Strickland's two-pronged analysis applies in this particular legal 
context. Indeed, Defendant's brief fails to even differentiate between Strickland's two 
prongs, instead collapsing the deficient performance and prejudice analyses into a single, 
conclusory sentence. See Aplt. Br. 18 n.2. 
"This approach to appellate advocacy flies in the face of our oft-repeated reminder 
that the appellate courts of this state are not a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231, ^ f 2,23 8 P.3d 
1103. This Court should therefore decline to address Defendant's unpreserved due process 
claim or his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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B. Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for not raising 
his due process claim. 
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's preservation and briefing failures, he has not 
met his heavy burden of proving that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing that his due 
process rights were violated by the preaccusation delay. Aplt Br. 18 n.2. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show two things: first, 
that trial counsel's performance was deficient—i.e, that it did not meet an objective standard 
of reasonableness; and second, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland'v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,694 (1984). In this case, Defendant's claim fails because 
he has not proven either deficient performance or prejudice. 
1. Defendant has not proven that his counsel performed deficiently by 
failing to move for dismissal based on a preaccusation delay. 
Strickland dictates that "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential." Id. at 689. While "[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, 
examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular 
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable." Id. When evaluating counsel's performance, 
a court must resist that temptation. Instead, the court "must indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
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assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
When raising an ineffective assistance claim, Defendant also bears the burden of 
assuring that "the record is adequate." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 16,12 P.3d 92. As 
a result, "an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it 
is supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at f 17. 
"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." 
Id. 
Here, Defendant's claim fails because there were legitimate strategic reasons for 
counsel's decision to not file a due process motion. Specifically, defense counsel repeatedly 
argued to the jury that the 11-year preaccusation delay suggested that the State's case was 
weak. See, e.g.,R. 342: 144-45, 153; 349: 146, 148, 178-80. But if counsel had raised the 
issue prior to trial in a due process motion, the result would have been the creation of a 
record about what the reasons for the delay actually were. If that record had shown that the 
delay was a reasonable one, counsel's ability to impugn the integrity of the prosecution in 
front of the jury would have been weakened. Given this, Defendant's deficient performance 
claim fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. 
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But more importantly, Defendant's deficient performance claim fails because he has 
not proven, on the present record, that his motion could have succeeded. See, e.g., State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 414 26,1 P.3d 546 (trial counsel does not perform deficiently by not filing 
a futile motion); State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^  34, 989 P.2d 52 (same). 
The statute of limitations is "the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale 
criminal charges." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,322 (1971); accord United States 
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977); State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, If 43, 152 P.3d 321. 
While due process also "protects against oppressive delay" in filing charges, its role is 
"limited." Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789. This is because the "determination of when the 
evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, 
and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions." Id, at 793. Moreover, 
"[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even after probable cause has 
been established, in order to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop 
further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury." Id. at 792 n.l 1. 
Courts have therefore repeatedly recognized that prosecutors have significant 
discretion as to when to file charges: "Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional 
duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to 
establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount 
necessary to support a criminal conviction." Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 n. 18 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Thus, "prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable 
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cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty would have a deleterious effect both 
upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself." Lovasco, 431 
U.S. at 791. The Due Process Clause therefore "does not permit courts to abort criminal 
prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek 
an indictment." Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. 
To show that a preaccusation delay violated due process, a defendant must 
accordingly satisfy a two-part test. Under this test, the defendant must not only show that the 
State acted in "bad faith," but also that he suffered "actual prejudice" from the delay. Hales, 
2007 UT 14,1 45. The defendant bears the burden of proof on both prongs. Id Here, 
Defendant has not proven that his counsel could have succeeded on either prong had he filed 
such a motion. 
First, Defendant has not proven that his counsel could have shown that the 
preaccusation delay was motivated by bad faith. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 45. To show bad 
faith, counsel would have been required to prove that the delay was "undertaken solely to 
gain tactical advantage." Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795; accord Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (holding 
that due process is only violated when the delay is "an intentional device to gain tactical 
advantage over the accused"). If the delay had been "for an investigative purpose," however, 
the due process claim would have failed, "regardless of whether" the delay actually resulted 
"in a tactical advantage for the prosecutor." Hales, 2007 UT 14, % 48. 
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As noted above, Defendant never raised this claim below, and the record is 
accordingly silent about what the prosecutors' reasons were for filing charges when they did. 
Defendant simply has not proven this delay was an "intentional device designed to gain 
tactical advantage," Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added), and his claim necessarily 
fails for this reason alone. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, |^ 17 ("Where the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." 
In any event, even the existing record still shows that the delay was a permissible 
"investigative delay." Hales, 2007 UT 14,148. The officers' efforts during the intervening 
years included investigations through INS regarding the "Jay Guerrero" letter, additional 
testing regarding various pieces of evidence, the use of public rewards and billboards, 
surveillance of Jamie's gravesite, cooperation with a number different media outlets on 
public specials on the case, and investigation of the various "leads" that were produced as a 
result. R. 348: 135-37, 162-63; 349: 9-10; PSI: 4. 
Thus, Defendant has not proven that his counsel could have established that the delay 
was the result of bad faith, rather than investigative delay. As a result, he has not overcome 
Strickland's strong presumption of reasonable assistance. 
Second, Defendant also has not shown that his counsel could have shown that he 
suffered actual prejudice from the delay. To show bad faith for purposes of the due process 
claim, Defendant was required to "establish[ ] that he could not have obtained the crucial 
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evidence from another source and that the evidence would have been available if it were not 
for the government's delay in filing the charges." Hales, 2007 UT 14, 145. Defendant 
alleges two sources of prejudice in his brief: first, the loss of a report from the State's 
mechanic; and second, the death of Jamie's grandmother. Aplt. Br. 18-20.7 
Mechanic's Report: Officer Smith testified that when he inspected Defendant's 
truck, he was able to start it in any gear from inside the cab, was able to shift the gears from 
under the hood, and use the parking brake. R. 348: 170-85. At trial, the State introduced an 
affidavit that Officer Smith signed on August 23,1996. R.348:177; State'sExh. 29. Officer 
Smith also testified that he had prepared "notes" of his inspection, but those notes had been 
lost in the intervening years. R. 348: 180. 
Defendant speculates that if those notes could be located, "it is likely that [they] 
would have corroborated" Defendant's account of the truck. Aplt. Br. 19. But he offers no 
evidentiary support for that speculation. As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, 
however, "[m]ere speculation about the loss of favorable evidence is insufficient to support" 
a due process claim. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 51. Rather, Defendant can prevail only by 
showing "actual prejudice." Id. at ^ f 45. He has not done so here, and this result is fatal to 
his claim. 
7
 Defendant vaguely claims that there could "have been additional defense witnesses 
and favorable evidence" if the charges had been brought earlier. Aplt. Br. 20. But 
Defendant can only prevail by showing "actual," rather than speculative, prejudice. Hales, 
2007 UT 14, ^  45. This suggestion provides no basis for relief. 
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Defendant is also incorrect when he claims that Officer Smith's affidavit supports his 
unfounded speculation about what the missing notes might have said. Aplt. Br. 25, 29. 
While Officer Smith's affidavit is admittedly silent about whether the gears could be shifted 
from inside the cab, Officer Smith specifically testified at trial that he remembered being 
able to do this. R. 348: 172-73. The affidavit's silence does not contradict Officer Smith's 
direct testimony, nor does it suggest that Officer Smith's notes would have contradicted the 
testimony, either. 
Moreover, even if the affidavit's silence somehow suggests that Officer Smith could 
not shift the truck into gear from within the cab, Defendant still cannot show that the missing 
evidence actually prejudiced him. The affidavit explained that the neutral safety switch had 
been disabled (thereby allowing Officer Smith to start the truck in gear without assistance 
from a second person). The affidavit also confirms that Officer Smith could shift the truck's 
gears from under the hood without getting under the truck. State's Exh. 29. Thus, the 
affidavit as a whole rebuts Defendant's claim that he needed Jamie's help that morning in 
order to start his truck. 
Grandmother's statement: A police report stated that Jamie's grandmother told 
police that on the night before the murder, she heard Defendant tell Jamie that she would 
need to get up early the next morning to help him "push the truck back." R. 348: 150. 
Sometime in the intervening years, Jamie's grandmother died, Aplt. Br. 20. Defendant now 
claims that he was prejudiced by not being able to call her as a witness. Aplt. Br. 20. 
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To show actual prejudice, however, Defendant must show that the "evidence would 
have been available if it were not for the government's delay in filing the charges." Hales, 
2010 UT 14, \ 51. In Hales, the supreme court emphasized that a defendant cannot base a 
due process claim on evidence that was lost before the delay became improper. Id. Here, the 
record is silent as to when Jamie's grandmother died. This is significant—if she had died two 
months after Jamie, for example, then the preaccusation delay would not matter because her 
testimony would have been unavailable even if the State had charged him immediately. 
Given the silence on this issue, Defendant's claim fails because he has not satisfied his 
burden of proving that her testimony became unavailable after the preaccusation delay had 
become improper. Id. 
Finally, both claims ultimately fail because Defendant cannot show that the loss of 
either Officer Smith's notes or Jamie's grandmother's testimony actually prejudiced him. At 
trial, the jury heard evidence of the truck's problems through a variety of sources, including 
Defendant's account to Detective Ownby (R. 348:109), as well as testimony from his sister 
(R. 342: 175) and brother (R. 348: 207). Given this, the grandmother's statement would 
have been cumulative. Moreover, given the direct testimony of Officer Smith about the 
truck's condition, as well as the testimony from Stephen Heidt showing that Defendant was 
alone when he left for work that morning, Defendant simply has not shown that the missing 
evidence caused "substantial prejudice" to his right "to a fair trial." Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. 
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In short, Defendant has not carried his burden of proving that the motion would have 
been successful. As a result, Defendant has not overcome the presumption that his counsel's 
decision not to file the motion was objectively unreasonable. 
2. Defendant has not proven that he was prejudiced by the delay in 
filing charges. 
In addition to showing that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, 
Defendant must show that he was prejudiced—i.e. that "there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 
1(38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
As noted above, this Court presumes that counsel performed reasonably when the 
record is silent on an issue. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 16. This same presumption applies to 
the prejudice prong. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f H 38,39,194 P.3d 913; State v. Perry, 
2009 UT App 51, If 13; 204 P.3d 880. Thus, proof of prejudice must be "a demonstrable 
reality and not a speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant never raised this claim below. As a result, his claim of prejudice 
necessarily rests on his speculation about what he believes the record might have shown if he 
had raised the claim, as well as his speculation about how that evidence might have factored 
into a due process analysis. This is plainly insufficient to show prejudice, particularly given 
his failure to request a 23B remand to supplement the record. Given this, this Court must not 
only presume that counsel acted reasonably, but also that Defendant was not prejudiced by 
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any alleged error. Defendant's unpreserved ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore 
fails. 
II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT COUNSEL WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT INTRODUCING 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to present 
additional evidence regarding the alleged problems with Defendant's truck (Aplt. Br. 23-30), 
and (2) failing to "secure the testimony of Brian Meik" (Aplt. Br. 30-33). 
A. Defendant has not proven that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not presenting additional evidence regarding the truck. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 
corroborating evidence of the alleged problems with his truck. Aplt. Br. 23-30. Defendant 
identifies two sources of evidence he believes should have been introduced: (1) testimony 
from a mechanic who had worked on his truck after it was released from the State (Aplt. Br. 
25-26); and (2) statements from his neighbor, Stephen Heidt, and from a police officer who 
spoke with Jamie's grandmother before her death. (Aplt. Br. 24-28). 
1. Defendant's proposed mechanic witness. 
Before trial, defense counsel gave notice that he intended to call Jeff Martinez, a 
mechanic, who would discuss "work done to [Defendant's] truck following" its release by 
"law enforcement" R. 103. 
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While Defendant now assures this Court that Martinez "would have corroborated 
Billy's testimony," Aplt. Br. 255 nothing in the record supports this claim. Indeed, nothing in 
the record even confirms that Martinez saw Defendant's truck, let alone explain what work 
he did on it. Thus, Defendant offers nothing but his speculation that Martinez's observations 
might have corroborated his account of the truck's problems. 
But speculation does not establish deficient performance. To the contrary, this Court 
"must 'indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance,'" and that the challenged action was "sound trial 
strategy.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542. Given that trial counsel was aware of Martinez and yet 
still chose not to call him as a witness, the presumption under Strickland must be that 
counsel reasonably believed that Martinez's testimony might ultimately hurt, rather than 
help, Defendant's claim regarding the truck. 
This is particularly the case given Defendant's failure to request a rule 23B remand on 
this issue. As noted above, Defendant "bears the burden of assuring [that] the record is 
adequate," and this Court "presume[s] that any argument of ineffectiveness ... is supported 
by all the relevant evidence of which the defendant is aware." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
ffif 16-17. If Martinez had truly examined Defendant's truck and concluded that Officer 
Smith's assessment was incorrect, Defendant had the obligation of creating a record to 
support that claim. He has not done so, and the claim necessarily fails as a result. 
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2. Additional testimony regarding his truck. 
Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for not introducing testimony 
from his neighbor, Stephen Heidt, and from a police officer about statements that Jamie's 
grandmother had allegedly made to him before the grandmother's death. Aplt. Br. 24-28. 
According to Defendant, this testimony would have corroborated his claim that Jamie had 
helped him start his truck on the morning of the murder. Aplt. Br. 24-28. This claim fails 
for three reasons. 
First, there was no deficient performance. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the 
proposed testimony would not have corroborated his account. Jaime's grandmother 
allegedly heard Defendant telling Jamie that she would have to get up early the next morning 
to help him "push the truck back." R. 348: 150 (emphasis added). In a similar manner, 
Stephen Heidt testified at the preliminary hearing that on one occasion, he had helped 
Defendant "push his truck out of the driveway." R. 32: 25-27 (emphasis added). 
But Defendant never claimed that he needed help "pushing" his truck back. Rather, 
he claimed that he needed help getting the truck into gear so that he could back it up and then 
drive it away. R. 348: 67-68, 109-10. He was unequivocal about this during his interviews 
with Detective Ownby, during which he said that Jamie had helped him put the truck into 
reverse to get out of the driveway, and that she had then helped him put it into drive so that 
he could pull away. R. 348: 67-68. Thus, the testimony that Defendant now regards as 
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"critical" actually contradicted his specific claim regarding the truck. As a result, Defendant 
cannot show that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to introduce it. 
Second, Defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that this 
testimony would have produced a different result at trial. At most, these witnesses could 
have provided only indirect support for his claim. The statement from Jamie's grandmother, 
for example, could have shown only what Defendant said about his truck the night before the 
murder. Stephen Heidt's testimony could only have shown that on a single occasion, he had 
helped Defendant in a manner that was inconsistent with Defendant's account of the truck. 
But the truck was examined by a police mechanic shortly after the murder. When that 
mechanic examined the truck, he unequivocally found that the truck could be started in 
gear—thereby obviating the need to start it in neutral with the assistance of someone else. 
He also found that a person could put the truck in gear from inside the cab without 
assistance, as well as from under the hood. R. 348: 173. 
Thus, Defendant's claim is ultimately that testimony from two witnesses who never 
operated the truck or saw its internal workings would have somehow convinced the jury to 
disregard the testimony of the expert mechanic who had inspected the truck to see if these 
problems really existed. Given these comparative differences, there is no probability, let 
alone a reasonable one, that this testimony would have changed the ultimate outcome. 
Third, even if this indirect testimony had convinced the jury to disregard Officer 
Smith's conclusions, this still would not have mattered because the undisputed evidence 
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showed that Defendant could shift the truck into gear on his own if parked on a flat surface. 
Defendant said that he did not need help shifting the truck into gear at work because he was 
able to park on a flat surface. R. 348: 71, 98. Defendant also claimed that that he was able 
to start the truck on his own at his sister's house the morning of the murder by using a 
mason's brush as the braking mechanism. R. 348: 113. 
Although Defendant's street was sloped downward, testimony at trial showed that his 
driveway was flat. R. 32: 39; 347: 41; 348: 256. Thus, if Defendant was able to start his 
truck and get it into gear by himself at work, and if he was able to do so at his sister's house 
that very morning, there is no reason to believe that he could not done so when he left his 
house at 6 a.m. on August 7-particularly given that his parking brake was fully functioning. 
R.348: 175. 
Given this, there is no reasonable probability that the result of this trial would have 
been any different it defense counsel had successfully offered the proposed testimony. 
B. Defendant has not proven that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not securing the testimony of Brian Meik. 
Midway through trial, defense counsel informed the court that he had been unable to 
secure the attendance of Brian Meik, who was Jamie's cousin. Counsel explained that 
because Meik had been listed as a potential State's witness, he had not subpoenaed him. R. 
348: 240. After learning that the State would not be calling Meik, counsel had been unable 
to locate him. R. 349: 116, 180-20. Counsel proffered that Meik would have testified to 
three things: first, Jamie had called Meik between one to three a.m. on the morning of the 
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murder; second, on either the day before or the day of the murder, Meik had seen a brown 
car parked in Defendant's driveway; and third, at Jamie's funeral, Meik had received a phone 
call "from an unknown individual who said, 'You did not see a brown car,' in a threatening 
way." R. 349: 117. Counsel asked for permission to introduce these hearsay statements 
through other witnesses. R. 349: 118. Following argument, the court denied Defendant's 
request. R. 349:120-21. Defendant now argues that counsel was ineffective for not securing 
Meik's attendance at trial. Aplt Br. 30-33. 
Regardless of whether counsel's failure to secure Meik's attendance constituted 
deficient performance, Defendant has not shown prejudice. To show prejudice, Defendant 
must prove that there is a "reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88,694. 
Here, even if Meik had testified as promised, there is no reasonable probability that Meik's 
testimony would have resulted in a different outcome. There are four reasons for this. 
First, defense counsel claimed that Jamie had called Meik sometime between one to 
three a.m. on the morning of her murder. R. 349: 117. But this was not inconsistent with the 
State's theory. As noted, Dr. Gray testified that Jamie was killed sometime before 6 a.m. R. 
346:61-62. Thus, even if Jamie had made the phone call as late as 3 a.m., the State's time of 
death assessment would not have been weakened. 
Second, the proffered testimony regarding the brown car was decidedly ambiguous. 
According to defense counsel, Meik would have testified that he had seen a car in 
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Defendant's driveway either on the day of the killing or the day before. R. 349:117. Given 
the uncertainty of which day, there is no reasonable probability that this testimony would 
produced any different result if considered by the jury. 
The claim regarding the alleged threatening phone call at Jamie's funeral is 
ambiguous as well. Even if true, this testimony says nothing about who made the call, who 
owned the brown car, when the brown car was actually in the driveway, or what the 
connection was between the car and Jamie's death. More importantly, even if the jury had 
inferentially imagined suspicious answers to these questions, the resulting speculation still 
would not have changed the core details of the State's case: that Jamie had been dead for 
several hours when Defendant left his home alone at 6 a.m., that Defendant acted 
suspiciously in the aftermath of her death, and that Defendant's explanations regarding his 
truck and his whereabouts were marked by inconsistencies and untruths. 
Third, the presumed impact of this testimony would have been to support Defendant's 
alternate theory of the crime: that after he left for work, Jaime was killed by intruders or 
robbers. But at trial, the State effectively showed that this speculative theory was 
inconsistent with the evidence. The intruder theory never worked, because Defendant had a 
"full sized pit bull" in his yard who was known to be "very protective and "aggressive" to 
strangers. R. 342: 190; 348: 58, 70. And the robbery theory was inconsistent with the 
evidence itself. When officers examined the trailer after the murder, they found a Rolex 
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watch, a roll of cash, Jamie's purse, and stereo equipment all sitting in plain view, 
untouched. R. 348: 57, 59-61, 101. 
Finally, in addition to the above, the record suggests that Meik's testimony would 
have assisted the State. During the discussion below, the prosecutor proffered that during the 
phone call between Meik and Jamie in the early morning of August 7, Jamie had told Meik 
that Defendant was "up to his same shit again." R. 349:119. The prosecutor also proffered 
that Jamie was "supposed to call him back" later that morning, but "didn't." R. 349: 119. 
In the context of the other evidence, this testimony would have been damaging to 
Defendant. For example, other evidence suggested that Defendant had been violent with 
Jamie in the past, as well as with Shareen Martinez. R. 348: 30, 38-41. If the jury had 
additionally heard that a few hours before her death, Jamie told her cousin Brian Meik that 
Defendant was "up to his same shit again," and the jury then learned that she did not call 
him back later that morning as promised, this could have supported the State's claim that 
Defendant killed her in an act of domestic violence. 
In short, Defendant's claim that Brian Meik's testimony would have helped him is 
based on nothing more than speculation. Moreover, the proffered testimony was decidedly 
ambiguous. When coupled with the potentially inculpatory nature of Meik's other testimony, 
and the other evidence pointing to Defendant's guilt, Defendant has not shown that there is a 
reasonable probability that Meik's testimony at trial would have resulted in a different result. 
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Ill 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE COURT ERRED BY 
REFUSING TO GIVE HIS PROPOSED INSTRUCTION 
VERBATIM, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THAT THE COURT 
ULTIMATELY GAVE THE INSTRUCTION IN SUBSTANCE 
Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error by not giving 
a particular jailhouse informant instruction that he had requested. Aplt. Br. 33-41. But the 
trial court gave Defendant's proposed instruction in substance; thus, there was no error. In 
any event, Defendant was not entitled to any such instruction in the first place. As a result, 
he cannot show harm. 
A. The trial court gave Defendant's proposed instruction in substance. 
When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, this Court considers the challenged 
instruction "in context with all other jury instructions provided to the jury." State v. 
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, ^ 23,219 P.3d 75 (quotations and citation omitted). Where "the 
jury instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error 
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it 
might have been." Id. 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have given the instruction given by 
Oklahoma courts under Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). See 
generally Aplt. Br. 34-35; R. 231-32. Although the trial court chose to not issue that exact 
instruction, R. 349: 130, the court did issue the following instruction the addressed the 
perceived credibility problems with a jailhouse informant's testimony: 
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The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and 
close scrutiny. In evaluating this testimony, you should consider the extent to 
which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any 
benefits from the party calling that witness. This does not mean that you may 
arbitrarily disregard this testimony, but you should give it the weight to which 
you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in this case. 
R. 280. 
This instruction was more than sufficient to address Defendant's concerns. For 
example, Defendant suggests that even if Miller did not have an express deal with the State, 
he might have testified based on an expectation of future leniency. Aplt. Br. 37-38,41. But 
the court's instruction specifically covered that, instructing the jury to consider "the extent to 
which" Miller "may have been influenced by the expectation of any benefits." R. 280 
(emphasis added). Defendant also suggests that the instruction was inadequate because it 
failed to refer to the number of other cases in which Miller was cooperating with the State, as 
well as the specific details of his prior criminal history. Aplt. Br. 37. In the court's other 
instructions, however, the jury was instructed to weigh "all of the facts and circumstances" 
regarding any witness's credibility, including any "facts and circumstances" that would 
"have a bearing on" any witness's "truthfulness or accuracy." R. 267. 
Given this, Defendant's ultimate complaint is not one of substance; rather, it is one of 
wording. "Beyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the jury instructions," the 
"precise wording and specificity" of jury instructions are "left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259,1j 18, 53 P.3d 486 (quotations and citation 
omitted); accord State v. Austin, 2007 UT 55, ^ 6, 165 P.3d 1191; State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 
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1217, 1226 (Utah App. 1993). And it is therefore noteworthy that some other courts that 
have held that a jailhouse informant instruction is required, have still held that the instruction 
is sufficient as long as it directs the jury to view the testimony with some caution. See, e.g., 
United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1409 (4th Cir. 1991) (regarding it sufficient to 
instruct the jury than an informer's testimony "must be examined and weighed by the jury 
with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness," with a determination of 
"whether the informer's testimony has been affected by an interest or by prejudice against a 
defendant"); United States v. Holmes, 229 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding it 
sufficient to instruct the jury to consider "whether the witness received money or benefits 
from the Government in connection with'the case"). 
In short, while Defendant argues that the trial court should have given the precise 
instruction he requested, the trial court ultimately gave an instruction that accurately set forth 
the reliability concerns regarding jailhouse informants to the jury. This decision was 
appropriate under the trial court's discretion. 
B. In any event, Defendant was not entitled to any instruction on the 
credibility of a jailhouse informant 
In any event, Defendant was not entitled to the instruction in the first place. As a 
result, he cannot show harm. 
Trial courts are generally prohibited from "commenting] on the evidence in the 
case." Utah R. Crim. Proc. 19(f). The "reason for this rule is clear: 'It is the sole and 
exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the 
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evidence offered by the State is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted.'" State 
v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^  22, 116 P-3d 360 (quoting State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1931)). Thus, trial courts are ordinarily "not permitted" to say anything that would allow 
"the jury to . . . infer[ ], maybe unfairly or incorrectly, [the judge's] opinion as to the 
credibility of the defendant and critical disputed issues of fact." State v. Beck, 2007 UT 60, <[| 
21, 165 P.3d 1225. 
In State v. Adams, 583 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1978), the supreme court applied this 
principle to jury instructions. There, the court rejected the use of a cautionary instruction 
regarding the credibility of police officers, noting that "under our law[,] the court does not 
comment on the evidence nor upon the credibility of testimony." Id. 
Rather than embracing witness-specific credibility instructions, Utah courts have 
instead favored the use of general credibility instructions. In State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 
204-06 (Utah 1986), the supreme court rejected the defendant's request for an instruction 
reminding the jury that the "defendant's theory of the case" was that the victim had 
"fabricated the charges against the defendant because of her dislike for him." The court 
explained that "[w]hile a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law 
underlying his .. . theory of the case,... . a defendant has no right to multiple instructions 
setting forth" that theory. Id. at 206. Other instructions in that case had instructed the jury to 
"take into account a witness's bias or motive for testifying." Id. As a result, the supreme 
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court concluded that a witness-specific instruction was unnecessary because the existing 
instructions already gave the defendant "all he needed to argue his theory to the jury." Id. 
No Utah decision holds that a defendant is entitled to a cautionary instruction 
regarding jailhouse informants, let alone the precise instruction that Defendant proposed. 
But a number of courts from other jurisdictions that have considered such claims have 
concluded that a general credibility instruction, coupled with cross-examination, is sufficient 
to address any concerns over a jailhouse informant's credibility. See Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293,311, 312 n.14 (1966); People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035,1040 (Cal. 1992) (the 
"standard instructions on judging the credibility of witnesses adequately guided the jury's 
assessment of the jailmate's testimony"); West v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d331,336(Ky. 
Ct. App. 2004) (the law does not require a court to "give greater scrutiny to [a] jailhouse 
informant's testimony" than that of other witnesses); Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801, 822 
(Va. 2003) (rejecting the use of an informant-specific instruction). 
In this case, Defendant was given a full opportunity to cross-examine Miller about his 
motives for testifying. In fact, the trial court suspended rule 609 so as to allow Defendant 
full rein in cross-examining Miller about his criminal background. R. 342: 15-17; 346: 15-
20; 347: 114-40. Defense counsel was also given wide latitude to address the Miller's 
credibility during closing argument. Counsel discussed Miller's prior criminal history, as 
well as the fact that Miller faced pending felony charges when he came forward. R. 349: 
180-81. And counsel was allowed to describe Miller as a "very manipulative," "very slick," 
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"sophisticated criminal who's playing [the prosecutors] for chumps," as well as argue that 
because of Miller's motivations, he was "lying under oath, like he's done many times," "to 
give the cops what he thinks they want." R. 349:183-84. Finally, the jury was specifically 
instructed that it must weigh "all of the facts and circumstances" regarding any witness's 
credibility, with particular consideration for any "facts and circumstances" that would "have 
a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy" of a witness. R. 267. 
In short, this jury was correctly instructed regarding its ability to take Miller's 
particular circumstances into account, and Defendant was given more than a full opportunity 
to attack Miller's credibility in cross-examination and argument. Defendant therefore has 
not shown reversible error. 
A final note is in order about what the record does—and does not say—about Miller's 
cooperation with the State. Throughout his brief, Defendant suggests that even if there was 
not an express deal between Miller and the prosecutors handling Defendant's prosecution, 
there was at least an implied deal. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. 1-2, 10-12, 38-40. Based on this, 
Defendant claims that that prosecutors made "a mockery of disclosure rules" by leveraging 
charges against Miller to procure his favorable testimony in this prosecution, and by only 
then changing their sentencing recommendation in his case almost immediately thereafter. 
Aplt. Br. 11,38. 
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In making this argument, Defendant omits several key facts from the record. First, 
Defendant never even acknowledges that the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to 
address this very question. See generally R. 405: 1-64. Second, Defendant never 
acknowledges that the trial court issued oral and written rulings on the question, both of 
which specifically rejected Defendant's assertion that there was ever a deal between the State 
and Miller. R. 369-72; 405: 62-64. Third, although Defendant insinuates that the State 
engineered the continuance of Miller's sentencing until after Defendant's trial, he ignores the 
undisputed testimony that the continuance was requested by Miller's defense counsel, not the 
prosecutor. R. 405: 9, l l . 8 Fourth, although Defendant repeatedly suggests that the State 
used Miller's prosecution as leverage to procure favorable testimony against Defendant, the 
undisputed testimony below was that the prosecutors who handled Defendant's case never 
spoke to the prosecutor handling Miller's case until after Defendant's case had concluded. 
R. 405: 25-26. Fifth, Defendant does not acknowledge that the sworn, undisputed testimony 
below was that Miller's cooperation ultimately earned him more time in jail, rather than less, 
given that the State kept him incarcerated so that he would be available to testify in another 
trial. R. 405: 33-34. 
Finally, in the course of arguing that that the decision by Miller's prosecutor to 
recommend a 32 day jail sentence was linked to Miller's testimony against Defendant, 
8
 While the prosecutor agreed to the continuance after Miller's counsel requested it, 
R. 405: 9, 11, no evidence suggests that she had ever proposed that the sentencing be 
continued. 
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Defendant fails to account for the prosecutor's sworn testimony to the contrary. Specifically, 
she testified that she was actually motivated by several legitimate reasons that had nothing to 
do with Miller's testimony against Defendant. R. 405: 6-38. Among others, she explained 
that Miller had only been charged with a non-violent property crime, that he had already 
spent more time in jail by the time of sentencing than he would have served if he had been 
sentenced immediately, that his victim was asking for his immediate release so that she could 
get restitution, and that she and Miller's attorney both believed that he would be in danger if 
sent to prison, rather than staying in the more secure jail setting. R. 405: 11-12, 24-25.9 
And while Defendant now repeatedly insinuates that she might have been lying during 
that testimony, Aplt. Br. 1-2, 11,38, nothing in the record supports that insinuation. Thus, 
the only evidence that exists in this case is the testimony that there was no such deal—which 
testimony is directly contrary to Defendant's assertions of prosecutorial misdealing. 
The Utah Supreme Court's Standards of Professionalism and Civility state that 
lawyers "shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other counsel or the court 
improper motives, purpose, or conduct." This same principle is set forth in the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which require parties to submit briefs "with accuracy" and "free from 
. . . scandalous matters." Utah R. App. P. 24(k). Here, Defendant has violated these 
At the evidentiary hearing, Miller's prosecutor acknowledged that she had 
mentioned Miller's cooperation when discussing the case with the judge at Miller's 
sentencing. R. 405: 18-19. But she also repeatedly insisted that her decision to change her 
initial recommendation had been motivated by the other factors discussed above. 
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standards by imputing improper motives to the career prosecutors who handled Miller's case 
and his own prosecution, a violation that is compounded by his failure to even inform this 
Court that his claims were considered and rejected after an evidentiary hearing below. 
In short, while Defendant insinuates that there was some sort of deal between Miller 
and the State, the unrebutted evidence below says the opposite. This Court should therefore 
disregard Defendant's unfounded suggestions to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted December 13, 2010. 
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